ICC Moves Forward with Charges Against Ugandan Fugitive Kony Amid Museveni’s Court Criticism

The Hague, Oct 30 – International Criminal Court (ICC) Pre-Trial Chamber III has confirmed that all conditions to hold confirmation of charges hearing in absentia of Ugandan fugitive Joseph Kony are now met. This development comes after nearly two decades since the ICC issued a warrant for Kony’s arrest, who has long eluded justice for his alleged role as the commander of the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), a rebel group notorious for its brutal tactics, including mass killings, sexual slavery, and the abduction of children.

Joseph Kony is a name synonymous with terror in Uganda and beyond. The ICC issued a sealed warrant for Kony’s arrest on July 8, 2005, which was later unsealed on October 13, 2005. He faces a total of thirty-three charges based on his individual criminal responsibility, including 12 counts of crimes against humanity and 21 counts of war crimes. These charges stem from the atrocities committed during the insurgency in Northern Uganda, where Kony’s LRA became infamous for its heinous acts against civilians. He faces crimes, occurring primarily between July 2002 and 2004, which include murder, sexual enslavement, abduction, mass burning of houses and looting, and the forced enlistment of children as soldiers.

For years, Kony has managed to evade capture, allegedly operating from remote regions of Central Africa. His continued freedom has raised serious questions about the effectiveness of international justice mechanisms, as well as the commitment of states to pursue accountability for such egregious crimes.

Alongside Kony, the ICC sought Vincent Otti, Raska Lukwiya, Okot Odhiambo, and Dominic Ongwen. Lukwiya and Odhiambo’s cases were terminated following their deaths. In 2015, Dominic Ongwen surrendered to ICC, prompting Pre-Trial Chamber II to sever his case from Kony’s to avoid delays. The Chamber opted not to pursue Kony and Otti in absentia. The two remain at large, almost two decades after the issuance of their warrants of arrest.

The ICC’s decision to hold the confirmation of charges hearing without Kony’s presence is unprecedented and signals a critical point in the Court’s operations. The Chamber, composed of Judges Althea Violet Alexis-Windsor, Iulia Antoanella Motoc, and Haykel Ben Mahfoudh, determined that Kony “cannot be found,” which fulfills one of the requirements outlined in Article 61(2)(b) of the Rome Statute. The judges concluded that all reasonable steps to inform Kony about the hearing and the charges against him were undertaken, including large-scale media campaigns in Uganda and neighboring countries, specifically targeting communities in the Acholi language.

While the confirmation of charges hearing was initially set for October 15, 2024, the ICC postponed this date to October 29, to give an opportunity for the Registry to enhance notification and outreach efforts to ensure Kony is made aware of the proceedings. The Court’s ability to conduct a trial in absentia, particularly under the constraints of the Rome Statute, highlights a growing recognition of the necessity for justice, even when the accused remains at large.

According to Rome Status, the confirmation of charges hearing is to determine whether there is sufficient evidence to establish substantial grounds for believing that Kony committed each of the 33 crimes charged. If the charges are confirmed, Kony will face full trial in person before the Trial Chamber.

President Yoweri Museveni’s relationship with The Hague-based Court has not been rosy. His relationship reflects a broader African criticism of international justice. Initially, Museveni supported the ICC’s involvement in the prosecution of Kony, recognizing the potential of international justice to address the grave atrocities committed by the Lord’s Resistance Army. However, as the years have progressed and Kony remains at large, Museveni’s administration has adopted an increasingly critical stance toward the ICC, framing it as an ineffective body that fails to consider the unique socio-political contexts of African nations.

This shift in perspective mirrors a growing sentiment across the continent, where the ICC’s credibility and relevance have come under scrutiny. Critics argue that the Court disproportionately targets African leaders and nations while failing to hold accountable those responsible for atrocities outside Africa. This perception has fueled accusations of “neocolonialism,” with leaders like Museveni asserting that ICC serves Western interests rather than addressing the complexities of African conflicts.

The backlash against the ICC intensified notably after the trials of Kenyan leaders, including former President Uhuru Kenyatta and his deputy, now President William Ruto, who faced charges related to the 2007-2008 post-election violence. As the cases unfolded, they highlighted the challenges the ICC faced in securing cooperation from member states and in navigating the political hostility of those it sought to hold accountable.

The Kenyan cases were particularly controversial; they proved difficult, more so with the ICC’s reliance on witness testimonies, many of which were undermined by intimidation, coercion, and a lack of political will from the Kenyan government. When the charges were ultimately dropped, critics claimed it signaled not just a failure of the ICC, but also a vindication of Museveni’s criticism that the Court was unable to operate effectively within the African context.

Since then Museveni has been seen as the greatest critic of the court. By engaging with other African leaders and influencing discussions within the African Union (AU), he has positioned himself as a defender of national sovereignty, arguing that African nations should have the right to address their own issues without external interference. This has led to a growing consensus among some African nations to reconsider their relationships with the ICC, with calls for withdrawal from the Court or reforms to its processes.

President Museveni particularly view the Court’s focus on Uganda’s conflict as emblematic of a broader issue, where African nations are viewed primarily through a lens of instability and conflict, allowing Western powers to claim a moral high ground. He claims that Uganda’s military efforts were sufficient to contain the LRA, making international interventions not only redundant but disruptive to Uganda’s sovereignty. However, Museveni’s rhetoric sidesteps a notable irony: the ICC has only targeted his adversaries, the LRA’s Kony, while sparing scrutiny of his government’s own actions during the conflict.

Mark Kersten, an Assistant Professor in Criminology at the University of the Fraser Valley and expert on international justice observes that this selective targeting is not an accident but was a strategic choice by the ICC. Lacking its own enforcement power, the Court relies heavily on the cooperation of states, which inevitably shapes its prosecutorial focus. In Uganda’s case, this reliance meant pursuing the LRA, as Museveni’s government had referred the situation and provided the necessary support—despite credible reports implicating government forces in abuses against civilians. Kersten notes this pattern across multiple cases where governments have referred their own conflicts to the ICC, typically leading to the prosecution of rebel groups rather than state actors.

Further complicating perceptions of the ICC, the Court’s reliance on external funding, often influenced by donor nations’ political interests, raises ongoing concerns about its neutrality. Museveni and other African leaders argue that this dynamic reinforces the view of the ICC as a tool of Western influence, not a truly impartial institution of justice. This perception has, in turn, fostered a sense of betrayal among those who initially viewed ICC as a potential avenue for justice for African victims.

Uganda’s path to justice with the ICC began in 1999 when it signed the Rome Statute, formally joining in 2002. In 2003, Uganda referred the northern conflict with the LRA to the ICC, leading to an investigation and arrest warrants for key LRA leaders, including Joseph Kony. In 2008, as part of a peace initiative, Uganda proposed a special High Court division to try lower-ranking perpetrators, while reserving ICC jurisdiction for top leaders. Despite peace talks stalling, Uganda affirmed its commitment to the ICC, and in 2009, the Court upheld the admissibility of the case, leaving the door open for both international and domestic proceedings against Kony.

Against this backdrop, the Court’s confirmation of charges hearing for Kony—held in absentia—becomes even more significant. For LRA victims, it offers a rare prospect of justice. Yet the Court’s approach, which has largely spared state actors, according to critics, highlights the limitations and biases inherent in international justice, sparking questions about its effectiveness in holding all parties accountable, regardless of political convenience