A New Power Shift in Africa’s Geopolitical Order: China’s Influence, But Is It Without Strings?

Nairobi, Sept 14 – As Nairobi’s skyline becomes increasingly dotted with cranes and construction sites, the journey from Mombasa to the capital via the Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) highlights a key chapter in China’s expansive engagement with Africa. This major infrastructure project, financed solely by Chinese loans, exemplifies China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Yet, its full potential remains hanging.

For Kenya’s SGR to achieve its economic potential, it needed to extend to Uganda to maximize cargo, revenue, and reduce operational costs. Instead, the line ends abruptly in Suswa, a quiet village 120 kilometers west of Nairobi. The project reportedly stalled when Beijing withheld $4.9 billion (about Sh738 billion), leaving the railway’s regional connectivity and economic benefits unfulfilled. Now, the gleaming concrete sleepers are stranded in this sleepy village, symbolizing the complexity of one of China’s built projects in Africa.

This partial success amidst grand promises highlights the growing dynamics between China and Africa. As global realignments and economic reconfigurations happen, China’s recent designation of its relationship with Africa as an “all-weather partnership” represents a significant geopolitical shift. This renewed commitment, formalized at the 2024 Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summit in Beijing, reflects a deepening of ties seen as mutually beneficial. Yet, the ambitious scope of this partnership raises concerns about its long-term implications.

China’s new 10-point action plan at the FOCAC summit promised nearly $51 billion (KSh6.5 trillion)—$10 billion more than in the 2021 summit—over the next three years. This package includes a $29.4 billion credit line, $11.2 billion in various forms of assistance, and at least $9.8 billion in investments by Chinese companies across Africa. This plan aims to reshape Africa’s future by promoting industrialization, infrastructure growth, and trade expansion, with commitments to creating at least 1 million jobs. The action plan shows a shift from large-scale infrastructure projects to more targeted investments.

The plan focuses on modernizing agriculture, infrastructure, trade, and clean energy. It includes 30 new renewable energy and  30 infrastructure connectivity projects across Africa. It offers zero-tariff treatment for all African Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and supports local value chains while expanding market access for African goods. China will launch an African SME empowerment initiative with financing support, 50 matchmaking activities, and 1,000 training opportunities for business managers. Additionally, a China-Africa digital tech cooperation center will be established to support 20 digital infrastructure and transformation projects. This plan aligns with China’s Global Development Initiative (GDI), solidifying its role as Africa’s top development partner.

Etsehiwot Negash Kebret, Development Finance Advisor at Development Reimagined, sees this move as a deep endorsement of China-Africa relations. She describes the 10-point plan as aligning with Africa’s development goals and asserts that “the elevation of the China-Africa relationship to an all-weather partnership underscores China’s strategic importance.” Kebret adds, “This was a strong indication of how important this partnership is to both sides,” challenging the view that China is “lending less” to Africa.

One of the notable developments from the FOCAC summit was the elevation of Rwanda to a “Comprehensive Strategic Partnership” with China. This designation places Rwanda among a select group of African countries benefiting from deeper cooperation in infrastructure, trade, and security. Rwanda’s partnership promises increased investment, technological exchange, and greater market access for Rwandan goods in China.

Rwanda’s economic growth and progressive governance have made it an attractive partner for China. However, this success story raises critical questions for other African nations. Sarah Amadi, a political analyst, notes, “Rwanda’s elevation is notable, but not all African countries can follow the same path. Countries with weaker governance structures might struggle to maintain sovereignty if they rely too heavily on Chinese support.”

Some African countries like Zambia and Sri Lanka in Asia have already ceded control over crucial assets, including ports and energy grids to China as part of repayment agreements, raising the question of whether China’s investments will empower African nations or make them more vulnerable to Beijing’s influence.

China’s 10-point action plan aims to modernize and industrialize Africa by boosting manufacturing and reducing reliance on raw exports. President Xi Jinping highlighted the need for a “just, equitable, and win-win,” with a focus on a “people-first, eco-friendly, and inclusive” partnership, pledging to deepen China-Africa cooperation through “ten partnership actions for modernization” over the next three years.

James Shikwati, Director of the Inter Region Economic Network (IREN Kenya), sees this as a step toward addressing global economic imbalances. “The 10-point plan implicitly recognizes the [skewed] global market system that favours the Global North and aims to adjust it for the benefit of the Global South,” he says, calling it an opportunity for Africa to strengthen its global trade position.

Dr. Adhere Cavince, an expert in Africa-China relations, further provides a nuanced view of the growing partnership. He describes China’s partnership action plan as a strategic move to enhance its influence in Africa while addressing key developmental needs. However, he warns that the benefits may not be evenly shared. “When one party provides funding, they may hold more negotiation power,” Dr. Cavince says, noting that African countries often struggle with effective negotiation due to limited language and cultural expertise.”

Dr. Cavince acknowledges that many of Beijing’s proposals resonate with African priorities, like job creation and energy transition, and highlights China’s focus on green energy technology as aligning well with Africa’s sustainable development goals. He advises African nations to build a solid knowledge base and involve experts for better negotiations. Instead of using politicians, some countries hire reputable international firms or advisors to help in high-level talks with China.

He points out that “politicians often prioritize projects that will be politically beneficial before elections,” which can impact negotiation dynamics. While pursuing development promises for re-election is acceptable, he notes that leveraging China’s responsiveness to people’s needs can strategically benefit African countries in negotiations.

Debt Traps, Transparency Issues and Management Challenges in China’s Financial Engagement

China’s growing influence in Africa brings both opportunities and risks. At the FOCAC summit, African nations seeking major debt relief received cautious responses, with China offering deferrals rather than forgiveness due to financial constraints. China’s past aggressive debt collection had threatened its image as a supporter of developing nations, likely leading to its current, more measured approach. While Chinese engagement disrupts Western dominance and avoids Western-style conditionalities, concerns about debt, sovereignty, and dependency persist.

Shikwati, however, refutes the “debt-trap diplomacy” narrative, arguing that African nations face greater influence from Western debt than Chinese loans. “The so-called ‘China Debt Trap for Africa’ has been debunked by several studies. The real issue lies with Western countries, which use debt to influence African public policies.” He believes that broader geopolitical factors complicate debt concerns.

Dr. Cavince supports this view, emphasizing that China’s financial aid is tailored to African requests and is typically project-specific. He explains that China’s use of Panda Bonds and currency swaps for instance aims to mitigate debt risks by enabling local currency transactions and reducing exposure to currency fluctuations. “Chinese funds are generally tied to specific projects, which reduces opportunities for mismanagement,” Dr. Cavince notes.

He also points out that Africa owes about 20% of its debt to China, with Kenya’s debt to China accounting for just 8-9% of its total public debt. “Even if Kenya repaid its debt to China, it would still face significant overall debt,” Cavince emphasizes, noting that other financial institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and Eurobonds are also significant contributors. In Kenya, addressing governance issues may prove more critical than focusing solely on debt concerns, which are often prone to mismanagement, he adds.

On her part, Etsehiwot Negash Kebret challenges the “debt-trap diplomacy” claims, saying that the narrative undermines African agencies. “This view assumes African countries are inferior in their relationship with China, and that are unable to make favourable deals and safeguard their interests and priorities,” she says. Kebret believes Africa’s debt issues are part of a larger international systemic challenge, where poor credit ratings make commercial borrowing prohibitively expensive and nearly impossible for developing countries.

Experts emphasize that African governments must enhance governance and transparency in international partnerships, including with China. Enhance clear communication with citizens for accountability and preventing misunderstandings. To address debt issues, they advise African nations to advocate for joint relief efforts between China and the West. By uniting through institutions like the African Union (AU), Africa can strengthen its negotiating position. They also suggest that an EU push for the AU to join the G20 could be a critical step toward achieving fair and collaborative debt negotiations.

China’s Non-Interference Policy: A Double-Edged Sword for African Sovereignty

China’s policy of non-interference in domestic politics contrasts with Western aid, which often includes governance conditions. For many African leaders, this approach is appealing, but the absence of overt conditions may have deeper implications. China’s control over key infrastructure projects and growing military ties raise concerns about indirect influence.

As part of the 10-point partnership plan, China has committed $140 million in military assistance, plans to train 6,000 African military personnel, and will support law enforcement and healthcare projects. However, the joint military exercise between Chinese and Tanzanian forces in August 2024 has sparked concerns about China’s military ambitions in Africa, particularly given China’s existing military base in Djibouti.

China’s military base in Djibouti, initially set up in 2017 as a resupply hub for anti-piracy efforts, has since expanded into a logistics center supported by the People’s Liberation Army. This suggests a broader strategy to secure trade routes, including the Mozambique-South Africa corridor, raising questions about China’s long-term military ambitions in Africa, particularly as it operates near a U.S. naval presence.

This comes amid a rising backlash against foreign military bases in Africa. In 2023, Niger and Burkina Faso expelled U.S. and French troops, which reflects a growing unease over external influence. The African Union’s 2016 warning on the risks of foreign bases is becoming increasingly relevant, casting doubt on China’s “non-interference” policy.

Some analysts say China’s growing influence in Africa is part of a BRICS strategy to challenge Western dominance, especially the U.S. The U.S. has focused on counter-terrorism through AFRICOM in regions like the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Recently, President Biden pledged to make Kenya a major non-NATO ally, the first sub-Saharan nation to receive this status. This signals deeper U.S. military ties as China’s presence in Africa expands.

“China’s non-interference stance sounds appealing, but when a foreign power controls essential infrastructure or has deep military ties, that influence naturally seeps into domestic decision-making,” warns Amadi. “This growing military presence could erode the sovereignty of some African nations, even as they remain eager to engage economically with Beijing.”

As Western nations continue to advocate for governance reforms, many African leaders are increasingly turning towards China’s emphasis on economic development. Beijing’s Global Civilization Initiative (GCI) offers a model that challenges traditional Western frameworks, providing a more pragmatic approach for nations focused on immediate growth.

Yet, the mixed outcomes of projects like the stalled Nairobi – Uganda Standard Gauge Railway illustrate the complexities and risks of this partnership and growing dependency. As the West’s moral authority on human rights and democracy struggles, China’s system may seem like a more viable option for African countries seeking alternatives.

“A possibility exists that China might market its system as an alternative model, as the West struggles with human rights and democratic ideals,” Shikwati projects.